

The UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: Tips for Users

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with an Update: Ischia, 3rd *Svuotare gli arsenali, costruire la pace* – April 19-20, 2018

Italy did not take part in the negotiations of the *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons*⁵ (hereafter called *Ban Treaty*) recently passed⁶ at UN on July 7, 2017: she is one of the 64 non-nuclear *NO states*, as we will call for short the 73 UN states (9 nuclear and 64 non-nuclear) that did not vote in favor of the *Ban Treaty* even if – with the only exception of the Netherlands – they did not actually vote NO, but simply refused to participate in the process. In May 2017, about one month before the start of the second, and final round of negotiations (15 June – 7 July), a few *USPID*, *ELN*⁷, *Landau Network*⁸ and *Pugwash*⁹ members considered appropriate to try to make their voice heard to recommend instead that Italy take part in the negotiations with an active role.

This has sparked a many-sided debate inside the said organizations, and in the end an *Open Letter* to the Italian Government¹⁰ has been produced and signed by 18 Italian personalities:

- the Secretary General and all the Scientific Council members of *USPID*
- the Secretary Generals and a few members of *Pugwash* and *Landau Network*
- the Coordinator and a few members of the Italian Group of the *ELN*

It has then been sent on June 7, and finally it has been disclosed to the press on June 12.

The *Open Letter* of course did not affect the Italian Government position (too little, too late), but nonetheless it has prompted a meeting of a delegation of five among the signatories with an high representative of the Italian Government: on June 15 they indeed met at the Foreign Ministry the Undersecretary of State, Sen. Benedetto Della Vedova who is in charge of arms control and international security issues.

The delegation expressed its concern for Italy's decision not to participate in the negotiations for a nuclear ban convention, a decision deemed not coherent with the obligation, established by the article 6 of the *NPT*¹¹ and confirmed by a 1996 International Court of Justice ruling¹², to negotiate "in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament..." It was also added that a nuclear weapons ban should not have been problematic for a country like Italy which has already renounced nuclear weapons by joining the *NPT* as a non-nuclear weapon state. The absence of *NATO* countries, moreover, could turn out being counterproductive even to *NATO* interests, because *NATO* states could have, for instance, argued and taken a position about a few sensitive points, as in particular the prohibition of nuclear weapons stationing in non-nuclear states territory, which instead are now included in the *Ban Treaty*.

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² *Unione degli Scienziati Per Il Disarmo*: <http://www.uspid.org/>

³ *Centro Interdipartimentale di ricerche sulla Pace*: <http://www.peace.uniba.it/>

⁴ http://www.uspid.org/Eventi/Archivio/2017_09Castiglioncello_main.html

⁵ <http://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8>

⁶ https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/A.Conf._229.2017.L.3.Rev_1.pdf

⁷ *European Leadership Network*: <http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/>

⁸ *Landau Network – Centro Volta*: <http://landaunetwork.org/>

⁹ *Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs*: <https://pugwash.org/>

¹⁰ http://www.uspid.org/Documenti/AltriDocumenti/Archivio/Ulteriori/2017_06_GG_LetteraGovernoItaliano.pdf

¹¹ *Non Proliferation Treaty*: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/>

¹² <http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/95/095-19960708-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf>

Undersecretary Della Vedova was also present at the subsequent *USPID-Pugwash* 17th Castiglioncello Conference (September 21-23, 2017) where he has explained the reasons that led to the decision not to participate in the UN conference. It would be useful to recall here that the Italian Government also had the occasion to clarify its position during a parliamentary Question Time on July 13 by answering in writing¹³ to six Italian MP's of the *SEL*¹⁴ group. In the present paper we will first try to briefly summarize some of the argumentations brought forth among the signatories of the *Open Letter*, and then we will add a few possible tips to take advantage of the accepted treatise.

There were first of all two levels of the discussion, overlapping but not exactly coincident, centered around two sets of questions:

- Is such a treaty desirable? Is its present text (draft and final) adapted to the needs of a realistically feasible disarmament? And if yes, how would it be possible in a foreseeable future to integrate the *NO-states*?
- What should have been the attitude of Italy and of the other non-nuclear *NO-states*? And in particular what about the provision forbidding the stationing of alien nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear states?

As for the point one, concerns were first of all raised that a legally binding instrument banning nuclear weapons voted by a majority of UN countries could produce a sort of reduction of all the 9 nuclear states to the level of "rogue countries". Could not this apparent political stretching imperil the *NPT* regime and maybe also produce its collapse? Apparently an unwelcome outcome. Beyond these risks of polarization between the *YES* and the *NO states* endangering the *NPT* regime (and maybe also the entry into force of the *CTBT*¹⁵), there were, and there are doubts and criticisms about the provisions themselves and their wording in the *Ban Treaty* as it was in the draft, and as it is today (namely as it has been voted on July 7). However we will neglect this much debated point referring rather for its details to the available literature¹⁶.

It should be said however that a disappointing formulation of the treaty text could, and should have been prevented by a larger participation of the *NO states*: their aloofness instead could turn out to be a rather shortsighted attempt to take advantage of this absence to just discredit the *Ban Treaty* waiting for its eventual demise as a useless piece of paper because of the absence of the main protagonists: the nuclear states and their retinue of *umbrella states*. This on the other hand seems to be a rather dangerous attitude in a world where some kind of control over nuclear weapons (plain ownership, double key, smuggling and so on) is increasingly seen as desirable by state and non-state actors either for their survival, or for projecting power, or even for terrorism. The disengagement of the nuclear states on the field of disarmament and their disregard for the said article 6 of the *NPT* is a strong incentive in this sense, and the roots of the present North Korean crisis could in part be traced back to this nuclear arrogance.

Also the international press has recently argued in this sense¹⁷: it is astonishing indeed to see how the nuclear states do not realize – or at least behave as they don't – that "the growing North Korean menace – for instance – also reflects the chronic failure of multilateral counter-proliferation efforts and, in particular, the longstanding refusal of acknowledged nuclear armed states such as the US and Britain to honor a legal commitment to reduce and eventually eliminate their arsenals. ... US, Russia, China, France and the UK ... have to some degree brought the North Korea crisis on themselves. Kim Jong-un's recklessness and bad faith is a product of their own." The *NPT* bargain, due to soothe the concerns of "vulnerable, insecure outlier states such as North Korea, ...

¹³ <http://aic.camera.it/aic/scheda.html?numero=5-11829&ramo=C&leg=17>

¹⁴ *Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà*: <http://www.sinistraecologia-liberta.it/>

¹⁵ *Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty*: <https://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/treaty/treatytext.t.html>

¹⁶ See for instance: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IN10731.pdf>

<https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/nuclear-ban-treaty-progresses-despite-us-led-objections>

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/world/americas/united-nations-nuclear-weapons-prohibition-destruction-global-treaty.html>

¹⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/05/nuclear-armed-nations-brought-the-north-korea-crisis-on-themselves>

has never been truly honored." And the situation has recently worsened, as we all know, so that "the need for nuclear disarmament through multilateral diplomacy is greater now than it has been at any stage since the end of the cold war."

As for the second point, the Italian Government motivations for not even taking part in the negotiations move around several arguments: the advisability of a more traditional and gradual road to disarmament through the existing treaties, the engagements taken as *NATO* members, the risks of political polarizations inside the international community, but oddly enough the quoted written parliamentary answer fails to mention precisely the contentious point of the stationing of US nuclear warheads on the Italian territory: a stationing that would be forbidden should Italy decide to sign the *Ban Treaty*

This was instead a topic well present in the debate among the signatories of the *Open Letter* to Italian Government. The provision that in any case, flawed as it may be, the article 1.1.g of the *Ban Treaty* makes is indeed that:

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: ... allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

This is in fact a good result, if the treaty proponents could induce enough non-nuclear states to accept, sign and ratify the *Ban Treaty*; and in fact to several of the signatories of the *Open Letter* it appears to represent the unique fairly concrete and realizable provision contained in it.

While indeed the successful negotiation of the *Ban Treaty* is generally considered as a boost for the goal of ridding the planet of nuclear arsenals, and although – by sending the clear message that the majority of the people in this world do not believe that these arsenals increase their security – it has been widely hailed as a remedy for some of the shortcomings in the existing legal and moral framework on such weapons, this success story – one of the few in this last troubled period – does not come without qualification.

The *Ban Treaty*, proposed by the six *NAC*¹⁸ states, was adopted on July 7 by 122 countries at UN, but it has been indeed¹⁹ "potentially fatally undermined by a boycott by the nuclear powers. The US, Britain and France declared, cynically as critics saw it, that they preferred to stick with the never-ending *NPT* route to disarmament." The very same route that – among others – "has helped to create an environment in which North Korea ... is rapidly advancing its nuclear ambitions with apparent impunity, at great risk to international stability." One could have hoped then that the at least the five recognized nuclear states with the *umbrella states* would have jumped on the opportunity to strengthen the *NPT* constraints against the present dangerous drift; and we have assisted instead to a sort of reckless Conspiracy of Silence against the negotiations, with the (not too secret) hope that they simply will fade away leaving everything exactly as it is today

It is openly acknowledged, then, that the *Ban Treaty* will be largely ineffectual from a legal standpoint (a treaty is really binding only for the countries that enter it), and that at this time it is rather a moral and political tool to advance a more ambitious disarmament agenda with the view of possibly luring (at least some of) the *NO states* into an acceptance of its principles: more or less as it happened in the case of the *Ottawa Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention*²⁰. But, besides that landmines and nuclear weapons are not exactly in the same class, even this evolution cannot be taken for granted.

One of the arguments, for instance, is that the large consent around the *Ban Treaty* sent the clear message that the majority of the people in this world do not believe that nuclear weapons increase

¹⁸ New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa)

¹⁹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/05/nuclear-armed-nations-brought-the-north-korea-crisis-on-themselves>

²⁰ <http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/the-treaty/treaty-in-detail/treaty-text.aspx>

their security. This would put a strong pressure on the *NO states* to finally enter the *Ban Treaty* even if they did not take part into its redaction. Also this statement however should be tempered. It is argued indeed that out of 195 UN countries eligible to vote²¹ 122 accepted the treaty – the 63.6% of all the countries, apparently a large majority – 1 voted NO, and 1 abstained, while 71 did not at all take part in the negotiations. But these too simplified numbers do not seem to say the whole story. The 195 UN countries are in fact very different from each other, and while fairly enough all have the same right to vote, their differences should also somehow be taken in to account.

The differences we refer to here are not only about their control of a nuclear arsenal, but also about their size and weight. The 73 *NO states* can indeed be sorted in several main groups: 9 nuclear and 64 non-nuclear (see Annex A)

- the 5 nuclear countries acknowledged as such by the *NPT*
- the 4 nuclear countries outside the *NPT*
- the 62 non-nuclear countries that did not participate in the negotiations
- the 2 non-nuclear countries that did participate, but either voted NO (1), or abstained (1)

These *NO states* encompass moreover:

- all the (to date) nuclear states
- the totality of the *NATO* states (nuclear + *umbrella countries*)
- 22 (out of 27) *EU* countries: only Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and Sweden voted YES

The group of the *YES states* on the other hand also contains South Africa and Kazakhstan (former nuclear), Saudi Arabia (which contributed to Pakistan arsenal), Brazil (which longtime ago had a secret nuclear project) and Iran (which is suspected to harbor nuclear ambitions).

As a number, 73 is just the 37.4 % of the 195 UN countries hinting to an almost 2/3-majority of the *YES states*, but let us look also at some homemade demographic²² and economic²³ statistics that are certainly reliable at least as orders of magnitude.

	countries	%	population (M)	%	GDP (US\$ B)	%
<i>NPT</i> nuclear	5	2,6%	2.009	26,7%	36.136	48,8%
non <i>NPT</i> nuclear	4	2,1%	1.570	20,9%	2.891	3,9%
non-nuclear NO	64	32,8%	988	13,2%	21.313	28,8%
non-nuclear YES	122	62,6%	2.944	39,2%	13.643	18,4%
TOTAL	195	100,0%	7.511	100,0%	73.983	100,0%

Instead of being a 2/3-majority of the UN states, the *YES states* account in fact for less than 40% of the world population, and are entitled to just less than 20% of its GDP. The 5+4 nuclear countries alone on the other hand amount to almost 50% of the world population, while the 5 *NPT* nuclear countries alone account for almost 50% of the world GDP.

On the plus side remark however that, for instance, Saudi Arabia (and all the gulf states), Iran and Kazakhstan voted YES: better still, if they sign and ratify the *Ban Treaty* in the future, Iran would be doubly committed to non proliferation, Kazakhstan would confirm its renunciation and Saudi Arabia

²¹ https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/A.Conf._229.2017.L.3.Rev_.1.pdf

²² [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_population_\(United_Nations\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_population_(United_Nations))

²³ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_\(nominal\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal))

would indicate that it will not seek its own deterrent. All three will moreover not accept nuclear weapons from other countries: not at all a foregone conclusion²⁴.

All that is not said to belittle the *Ban Treaty* outcome: showing these numbers could be seen indeed as rather cynical and unfair, if not utterly defeatist, but in fact it is only used here to gauge the amplitude of the gap to be filled in order to take advantage of this treaty. Arguably the public opinion in every country is not monolithic, and also in many *NO states* there are vociferous antinuclear, pacifist movements that could influence their governments into entering the *UN Ban Treaty*. But the present North Korean missile and *H-bomb* crisis, instead of being understood as the byproduct of the myopic policies of the nuclear states, seems to contribute to the impression that it is impossible to get rid of nuclear weapons. Also the stress laid on the Russia new assertiveness seems to go in the opposite direction, namely against an abandonment of nuclear weapons, and even in favor of the presumed reassurance provided by the presence of US nuclear weapons.

TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

Can we hope then in a *Landmine Convention effect*? Could we somehow trigger a consensus *snowball*? Persuading not the already convinced, but the unconvinced would not be easy. Of course the most difficult would be to modify the position of the 5+4 nuclear states: for understandable reasons their commitment to the nuclear weapons is the strongest. It would be easier hence try to change at least the minds of the non-nuclear states that did not participate into the negotiation, even if their absence made things more difficult. With their nonattendance in fact they also refused, for instance, to acknowledge what provisions (if any) they could accept beyond a mere statement banning the nuclear weapons as inhumane. Moreover, five of these states (Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Turkey) must not only agree in principle, but must also get rid of the US nuclear weapons stationed on their territory. This of course is all within what *USPID*, *Pugwash* and other actors in the arms control community propose since many years, but they also know how difficult it has been in the past to get the governments attention (let alone their approval) about this elimination. However, because of the public opinion orientation, countries like Germany, Japan, Belgium, Netherlands and Italy (all non-nuclear *NO states*) could be easier to move into the YES field, and we can only work toward some shift in these countries to begin upending the balance. The *USPID* Scientific Council already took in 2008 a position²⁵ against US nuclear weapons in Italy: in this sense a renewed effort of *USPID* in the direction of convincing the Italian public, Parliament and Government, and maybe an updated version of the 2008 document would be highly advisable.

²⁴ The *Ban Treaty* has been open for signature on September 20, 2017, and – at the date of this writing – 53 countries have already signed it and 3 have ratified; Iran, Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia, however, did not yet sign it, as can be seen at the UN web page https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-9&chapter=26&clang=_en

²⁵ http://www.uspid.org/Documenti/AltriDocumenti/Archivio/UfficialiConsiglioScientifico/2008_05_CS_en.pdf

UPDATE

April 2018

More than eight months after its adoption the state of the treaty ratifications looks rather lamentable, as can be seen from the official UN web page²⁶ (see Annex B): there are 57 signatories (just 4 more than in September 2017), but only 7 parties (namely ratifications, 4 more than in September 2017): Cuba, Guyana, Holy See, Mexico, State of Palestine, Thailand and Venezuela. This looks not yet as the hoped *snowball effect*. According to the article 15.1, the treaty shall enter into force "90 days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited." We are then very far from the target. Remember as a benchmark that the *Ottawa Treaty* (against the anti-personnel mines) adopted in December 1997 entered into force in March 1999, less than 15 months after its adoption, and that the condition was then the ratifications of at least forty states.

Even less heartening is a look to signatories and parties. Needless to say few of the (either nuclear, or non-nuclear) non-participating *NO states* changed their mind, only five to be precise: Central African Republic, Comoros, Libya, Nicaragua and Tuvalu. But there is more: apparently neither all the 122 non-nuclear *YES states* signed – not to say ratified – the treaty. In particular Iran and Saudi Arabia are still missing: Kazakhstan instead signed in March 2018. On the other hand, among the six states of the New Agenda Coalition (which strongly advocated the treaty adoption), only Mexico ratified its accession: Brazil, Ireland, New Zealand and South Africa just signed, while Egypt not even bothered to do that.

No large opinion mobilization seems to be in sight with the aim to change this stalemate.

The previous conclusions of this paper (page 5) are then reaffirmed, and its subsequent indications look even more urgent before the treaty definitely slips into oblivion in a forgetful, unfriendly environment.

April 15, 2018

²⁶ https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-9&chapter=26&clang=_en

General Assembly - other

United Nations conference to negotiate a legally-binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons: Second session

Vote Name:

Item 9, A/CONF.229/2017/L.3/Rev.1

Draft treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons

Yes

122

No = N

1

Abstain = A



List of the 195 UN countries
71 = 5 + 4 + 62 did not participate

Vote Time: 7/7/2017 10:47:53 AM

Y	AFGHANISTAN		DOMINICA	S	LIECHTENSTEIN	S	SAN MARINO
	ALBANIA		Y DOMINICAN REPUBLIC		LITHUANIA	S	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
S	Y ALGERIA	S	Y ECUADOR		LUXEMBOURG	Y	SAUDI ARABIA
	ANDORRA		Y EGYPT	S	Y MADAGASCAR	Y	SENEGAL
Y	ANGOLA	S	Y EL SALVADOR	S	Y MALAWI		SERBIA
Y	ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA		Y EQUATORIAL GUINEA	S	Y MALAYSIA	Y	SEYCHELLES
Y	ARGENTINA		Y ERITREA		MALDIVES	Y	SIERRA LEONE
	ARMENIA		ESTONIA		MALI	A	SINGAPORE
	AUSTRALIA		Y ETHIOPIA	Y	MALTA		SLOVAKIA
S	Y AUSTRIA	S	Y FIJI	Y	MARSHALL ISLANDS		SLOVENIA
Y	AZERBAIJAN		FINLAND	Y	MAURITANIA	Y	SOLOMON ISLANDS
Y	BAHAMAS		FRANCE	Y	MAURITIUS		SOMALIA
Y	BAHRAIN		Y GABON	R	Y MEXICO	S	Y SOUTH AFRICA
S	Y BANGLADESH	S	Y GAMBIA		MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)		SOUTH SUDAN
	BARBADOS		GEORGIA		MONACO		SPAIN
	BELARUS		GERMANY	Y	MONGOLIA	Y	SRI LANKA
	BELGIUM	S	Y GHANA		MONTENEGRO	R	Y STATE OF PALESTINE
Y	BELIZE		GREECE	Y	MOROCCO	S	Y SUDAN
Y	BENIN		Y GRENADA	Y	MOZAMBIQUE	Y	SURINAME
Y	BHUTAN	S	Y GUATEMALA	Y	MYANMAR		SWAZILAND
Y	BOLIVIA (PLURINATIONAL STATE OF)		GUINEA	S	Y NAMIBIA	Y	SWEDEN
	BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA		Y GUINEA-BISSAU		NAURU	Y	SWITZERLAND
Y	BOTSWANA	R	Y GUYANA	S	Y NEPAL		SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
S	Y BRAZIL		Y HAITI		N NETHERLANDS		TAJIKISTAN
Y	BRUNEI DARUSSALAM	R	Y HOLY SEE	S	Y NEW ZEALAND	R	Y THAILAND
	BULGARIA	S	Y HONDURAS	S	NICARAGUA	S	THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
	BURKINA FASO		HUNGARY		NIGER	Y	TIMOR-LESTE
Y	BURUNDI		ICELAND	S	Y NIGERIA	S	Y TOGO
S	Y CABO VERDE		INDIA		NORWAY	Y	TONGA
Y	CAMBODIA	S	Y INDONESIA	Y	OMAN	Y	TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
	CAMEROON		Y IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF)		PAKISTAN	Y	TUNISIA
	CANADA	S	Y IRAQ	S	Y PALAU		TURKEY
S	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	S	Y IRELAND	S	Y PANAMA		TURKMENISTAN
Y	CHAD		ISRAEL	Y	PAPUA NEW GUINEA	S	TUVALU
S	Y CHILE	S	Y ITALY	S	Y PARAGUAY	Y	UGANDA
	CHINA	S	Y JAMAICA	S	Y PERU		UKRAINE
Y	COLOMBIA		JAPAN	S	Y PHILIPPINES	Y	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
S	COMOROS	Y	JORDAN		POLAND		UNITED KINGDOM
S	Y CONGO	S	Y KAZAKHSTAN		PORTUGAL	Y	UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
S	Y COSTA RICA		Y KENYA	Y	QATAR	Y	UNITED STATES
S	Y COTE D'IVOIRE	S	Y KIRIBATI		REPUBLIC OF KOREA	S	Y URUGUAY
	CROATIA		Y KUWAIT	Y	REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA		UZBEKISTAN
R	Y CUBA		KYRGYZSTAN	Y	ROMANIA	S	Y VANUATU
Y	CYPRUS	S	Y LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC		RUSSIAN FEDERATION	R	Y VENEZUELA
	CZECH REPUBLIC		LATVIA		RWANDA	S	Y VIET NAM
	DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF KOREA	Y	LEBANON	Y	SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS	Y	YEMEN
S	Y DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	Y	LESOTHO	Y	SAINT LUCIA		ZAMBIA
	DENMARK	Y	LIBERIA	S	SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	Y	ZIMBABWE
Y	DJIBOUTI	S	LIBYA	S	SAMOA		

Y = yes
S = signed
R = ratified

color code for non-participating states

4 non-NPT nuclear states
5 NPT nuclear states
62 non-nuclear states

9. TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

New York, 7 July 2017

NOT YET IN FORCE

STATUS:
TEXT:

in accordance with article 15(1) this Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.

Signatories: 57. Parties: 7.
Certified true copy

CN.475.2017.TREATIES-XXVI-9 of 9 August 2017 (Opening for signature) and
CN.476.2017.TREATIES-XXVI-9 of 9 August 2017 (Issuance of Certified True Copies).

Note: The Treaty was adopted on 7 July 2017 by the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, held in New York from 27 to 31 March and 15 June to 7 July 2017. In accordance with its article 13, the Treaty shall be open for signature to all States at United Nations Headquarters in New York as from 20 September 2017.

<i>Participant</i>	<i>Signature</i>	<i>Acceptance(A), Approval(AA), Ratification, Accession(a)</i>	<i>Participant</i>	<i>Signature</i>	<i>Acceptance(A), Approval(AA), Ratification, Accession(a)</i>
Algeria	20 Sep 2017		Democratic Republic		
Austria	20 Sep 2017		Libya	20 Sep 2017	
Bangladesh.....	20 Sep 2017		Liechtenstein.....	20 Sep 2017	
Brazil	20 Sep 2017		Madagascar	20 Sep 2017	
Cabo Verde	20 Sep 2017		Malawi	20 Sep 2017	
Central African Republic	20 Sep 2017		Malaysia.....	20 Sep 2017	
Chile.....	20 Sep 2017		Mexico	20 Sep 2017	16 Jan 2018
Comoros.....	20 Sep 2017		Namibia	8 Dec 2017	
Congo.....	20 Sep 2017		Nepal.....	20 Sep 2017	
Costa Rica.....	20 Sep 2017		New Zealand.....	20 Sep 2017	
Côte d'Ivoire	20 Sep 2017		Nicaragua.....	22 Sep 2017	
Cuba.....	20 Sep 2017	30 Jan 2018	Nigeria	20 Sep 2017	
Democratic Republic of the Congo.....	20 Sep 2017		Palau	20 Sep 2017	
Ecuador	20 Sep 2017		Panama.....	20 Sep 2017	
El Salvador	20 Sep 2017		Paraguay	20 Sep 2017	
Fiji	20 Sep 2017		Peru	20 Sep 2017	
Gambia.....	20 Sep 2017		Philippines	20 Sep 2017	
Ghana.....	20 Sep 2017		Samoa	20 Sep 2017	
Guatemala.....	20 Sep 2017		San Marino	20 Sep 2017	
Guyana.....	20 Sep 2017	20 Sep 2017	Sao Tome and Principe..	20 Sep 2017	
Holy See	20 Sep 2017	20 Sep 2017	South Africa.....	20 Sep 2017	
Honduras.....	20 Sep 2017		St. Vincent and the Grenadines	8 Dec 2017	
Indonesia.....	20 Sep 2017		State of Palestine	20 Sep 2017	22 Mar 2018
Ireland.....	20 Sep 2017		Thailand	20 Sep 2017	20 Sep 2017
Jamaica	8 Dec 2017		Togo.....	20 Sep 2017	
Kazakhstan.....	2 Mar 2018		Tuvalu.....	20 Sep 2017	
Kiribati.....	20 Sep 2017		Uruguay	20 Sep 2017	
Lao People's	21 Sep 2017		Vanuatu.....	20 Sep 2017	

<i>Participant</i>	<i>Signature</i>	<i>Acceptance(A), Approval(AA), Ratification, Accession(a)</i>
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	20 Sep 2017	27 Mar 2018

<i>Participant</i>	<i>Signature</i>	<i>Acceptance(A), Approval(AA), Ratification, Accession(a)</i>
Viet Nam.....	22 Sep 2017	

CUBA

The prohibition on the testing nuclear weapons contained in Article 1(a) encompasses all forms of testing, including those performed using non-explosive methods such as subcritical testing and computer simulation.

The transit of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices through territory under the jurisdiction of the States Parties to this Treaty is also a prohibited activity according to the provisions of Article 1(e).

The financing of any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty is also a prohibited activity according to the provisions of Article 1(e).

The declarations that States Parties are required to make under Article 2 must include information on any activity they carry out that is prohibited under Article 1.

